First, the new contract should include inspections of two types of delivery systems that are not limited by new START systems: NTs and IGLBGMs (although Avangard is an exception). Inspections of IGLBGMs would reflect those of ICBMs. Given that Avangard is responsible for the treaty, Russia and the United States have probably developed inspection procedures that could be applied to other IGLBGMs. Testing methods for NT would be based on procedures for SLBMs. NT inspections may be a little easier, as it should be acceptable to consider that each NT has only one warhead, while the number of re-entry vehicles placed on an SLBM should be verified. A follow-up contract should include a stricter provision, which automatically requires that new species be responsible and that only negotiations on how to implement are to be conducted. This provision should apply to both nuclear and non-nuclear weapons of strategic scope. However, their scope should be limited to species that emerged as a result of negotiations, not to existing forms that are not responsible, as both parties disagreed on whether this should be the case. In order to further clarify the purpose of this provision, Russia and the United States should negotiate an agreed-upon declaration containing non-exhaustive lists of weapons that they would consider and consider to be new species. Many silo-based intercontinental missiles in Russia are loaded with several warheads. In a serious conflict, the United States would be encouraged to attack these weapons preemptively, which in turn would put pressure on Russia to use them while it is still possible.
In order to reduce the number of warheads on the Russian isilo-based ICBM and thus reduce this risk, the ratio between strategically used warheads and the disposal systems used in a subsequent contract should be significantly lower than the 2.2 to 1 value of New START. The SALT II negotiations were opened at the end of 1972 and lasted seven years. A fundamental problem in these negotiations was the asymmetry between the strategic forces of the two countries, as the USSR had concentrated on missiles equipped with large warheads, while the United States had developed smaller missiles with greater precision. Questions were also raised about new technologies in development, definition questions and verification methods. Assessment and outlook. The main obstacles to entering a follow-up agreement are political. They are important, but not necessarily insurmountable. One of the challenges, particularly within the United States, is the domestic policy of treaty ratification. Congress`s recent support for the extension of New START indicates that there is some multi-party support for arms control – which could be the subject of a well-conducted ratification campaign.
Finally, as negotiated, the SALT-II Treaty limited the number of strategic launchers (i.e. missiles that could be equipped with several independent re-entry vehicles [MIRV]) return vehicles, with the aim of repeling the moment when land-based ICBM systems on both sides would become vulnerable to attacks by these missiles. The number of MIRVed ICBMs, MIRVed SLBMs, heavy (i.e. long-range) bombers and the total number of strategic launchers were limited. The treaty set a total limit of about 2,400 of all these weapons systems for each side. The SALT II Treaty was signed in Vienna on 18 June 1979 by Presidents Jimmy Carter and Brezhnev and submitted shortly thereafter for ratification by the US Senate.